Soviet Trade: In America's Best Interest?

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Introduction

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Overview

The rapid change in U.S.-Soviet relations during the 1980s has been astounding. Ronald Reagan began his presidency denouncing the Soviet Union as an untrustworthy “evil empire” bent on conquering the world. It was naive, he suggested, to engage in arms control negotiations with such a monster; only a massive buildup in U.S. military power would protect us from Soviet imperialism. Eight years and $2 trillion later, Reagan had participated in four summits with his Soviet counterpart Mikhail S. Gorbachev, signed a long-awaited treaty removing nuclear weapons from Europe, and agreed to more open contacts between the two superpowers than they had enjoyed since the end of World War II.

The reasons for this sea change in U.S. policy can be traced above all to the figure of Gorbachev himself. Since gaining power in April 1985, the Soviet leader has aggressively pursued a program of revolutionary reforms aimed at saving his country's ailing economy. Collectively known as perestroika, these reforms require a shift in Soviet resources from military to civilian uses. The signs of this shift are numerous. Gorbachev announced in December he would unilaterally withdraw a half-million Soviet troops and 10,000 tanks from Eastern Europe. Negotiations to reduce conventional, or non-nuclear, weapons “from the Atlantic to the Urals” are due to commence in March. Soviet troops are scheduled to complete their withdrawal from Afghanistan by Feb. 15, while Soviet-supported Cuban forces are due to leave Namibia under a peace plan signed last year.