Report Outline
Neutron Bomb Developments
European Defense Strategy
Prospects for Arms Control
Special Focus
Neutron Bomb Developments
Response to French Neutron Bomb Test
When the United States and its partners in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) first discussed production of the neutron bomb several years ago, the issue proved too hot to handle. No head of state on either side of the Atlantic wanted to take responsibility for introducing the controversial weapon, which is designed to kill enemy troops within a restricted radius while causing little physical damage. After months of negotiations in 1977–78 to get the Europeans to accept deployment of the weapons, President Carter abruptly reversed himself and decided to defer neutron bomb production.
The debate in NATO over the neutron bomb is likely to be revived in the wake of a recent revelation that France has developed and tested a neutron warhead. French President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, who disclosed the test at a June 26 press conference, said France would decide within two or three years whether to go ahead and start producing the weapons. Although France is not a member of the formal NATO defense structure, its decision could lead other European leaders to more readily accept the weapon.
Giscard's announcement received a mixed response in Washington. The Carter administration reaffirmed its official opposition to deploying neutron bombs in Europe, but was careful to leave open its option to develop an American version of the weapon. Privately, many Pentagon officials applauded Giscard's announcement, saying it would make U.S. production of the neutron bomb politically easier. Some U.S. military officials pointed to the announcement as evidence that France is moving closer to the nuclear strategy of the NATO allies — which emphasizes “flexible response” and tactical nuclear weapons — and away from the doctrine of massive retaliation espoused by former President Charles de Gaulle. It was partly because of disagreements over nuclear strategy that de Gaulle withdrew French forces from the NATO command in the mid-1960s. |
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Weapons of Mass Destruction |
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Jul. 29, 2016 |
Modernizing the Nuclear Arsenal |
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Mar. 08, 2002 |
Weapons of Mass Destruction |
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Jan. 31, 1997 |
Chemical and Biological Weapons |
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Jun. 24, 1994 |
Nuclear Arms Cleanup |
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Jun. 05, 1992 |
Nuclear Proliferation |
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Jun. 29, 1990 |
Obstacles to Bio-Chemical Disarmament |
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Apr. 22, 1988 |
The Military Build-Down in the 1990s |
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May 24, 1987 |
Euromissile Negotiations |
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Jul. 11, 1986 |
Chemical Weapons |
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Apr. 27, 1984 |
Reagan's Defense Buildup |
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Jun. 04, 1982 |
Civil Defense |
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Jul. 17, 1981 |
Controlling Nuclear Proliferation |
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Jun. 05, 1981 |
MX Missile Decision |
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Aug. 15, 1980 |
The Neutron Bomb and European Defense |
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Sep. 07, 1979 |
Atomic Secrecy |
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Mar. 17, 1978 |
Nuclear Proliferation |
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May 27, 1977 |
Chemical-Biological Warfare |
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May 13, 1977 |
Politics of Strategic Arms Negotiations |
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Nov. 15, 1974 |
Nuclear Safeguards |
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Jul. 01, 1970 |
Nuclear Balance of Terror: 25 Years After Alamogordo |
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Jun. 18, 1969 |
Chemical–Biological Weaponry |
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Jun. 30, 1965 |
Atomic Proliferation |
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Mar. 21, 1962 |
Nuclear Testing Dilemmas |
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Aug. 16, 1961 |
Shelters and Survival |
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Oct. 12, 1959 |
Chemical-Biological Warfare |
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May 13, 1959 |
Nuclear Test Ban |
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Dec. 04, 1957 |
Scientific Cooperation and Atlantic Security |
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May 15, 1957 |
Changing Defense Concepts |
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Jul. 03, 1956 |
Civil Defense, 1956 |
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Nov. 16, 1955 |
International Arms Deals |
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Oct. 04, 1954 |
Industrial Defense |
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Apr. 15, 1954 |
National Defense Strategy |
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Feb. 10, 1954 |
New Aproaches to Atomic Control |
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Oct. 10, 1953 |
Atomic Information |
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Apr. 11, 1952 |
Biological Warfare |
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Oct. 03, 1951 |
World Arms Race |
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Feb. 04, 1948 |
International Control of Atomic Energy |
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Dec. 06, 1946 |
International Inspection |
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Aug. 27, 1943 |
Gas Warfare |
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Jul. 24, 1937 |
The New Race in Armaments |
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May 05, 1932 |
Abolition of Aggressive Weapons |
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