A document from the CQ Researcher archives: Report Outline
Opening Salt's Second Round
Arms Control Efforts Since 1945
The Coming Ratification Debate
Special Focus Opening Salt's Second Round Treaty Signing: Prelude to Senate Struggle When President Carter and Soviet leader Leonid I. Brezhnev meet in Vienna on June 15 for the signing of the new strategic arms limitation treaty (SALT II), the event will mark the end of a series of arduous negotiations that began not long after President Nixon's signing of SALT I in Moscow seven years ago. But unlike 1972 when Senate approval of the first treaty came with unexpected ease, a hard fight and close vote on ratification are expected this year. The scenario currently envisioned in Congress is for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to open summer-long hearings in July and for Senate floor debate to begin soon after the traditional August recess. The national debate has already begun outside the halls of Congress and is likely to intensify as the year wears on. The president and top administration officials have warned that rejection of the treaty could end detente, kill any hope of a new strategic arms agreement, harm other arms control efforts such as the Vienna talks on European force reductions and attempts to curb sales of conventional arms, disrupt America's relations with its allies, undermine its image as a peace-loving nation, and provoke other nations to acquire nuclear weapons. Even if the Senate were merely to amend the treaty, Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance has said, the strategic arms negotiations might be damaged beyond repair. President Carter asserted on May 10 that if the treaty were rejected “we would be looked upon as a warmonger.” Sen. Sam Nunn, D-Ga., rejects such remarks as self-destructive. “I'd like the Soviets to at least go out and invent their own propaganda,” he said in response to Carter's statement. Nunn, respected among his colleagues and especially among southern senators as an expert on defense, has made it clear that he will subject the treaty to close scrutiny regardless of what lofty claims are made for it by administration officials. Many of the Senate's other leaders on defense policy are expected to do the same. With a technical and complicated debate in the offing, the public may find its attention span sorely strained in the coming months. As the debate heats up, language is likely to turn increasingly arcane. Ordinary words will give way to ASBMs (air-to-surface ballistic missiles), RVs (reentry vehicles), ALCMs (air-launched cruise missiles), FRODs (“functionally related observable differences”), and the like. With technicalities complex and military consequences potentially vast, the military and its scientific advisers have joined the president and Senate as a third force in treaty considerations. The president and senators, sensitive to criticism that they are trading away some element of national security, must reckon with the assessments of the Pentagon and their effect on the electorate. Provisions for U.S.-Soviet Nuclear Parity The new treaty attempts to establish strategic parity between the two superpowers on terms that can be adequately verified. This is only superficially a simple objective. Differences between U.S. and Soviet military forces, and between the societies they defend, make agreement on weapons limitations and verification procedures an extraordinarily difficult business. Russia relies heavily on land-based missiles and only secondarily on submarine-launched missiles, while the United States deploys a much larger proportion of its nuclear arsenal on submarines and bombers. Parity therefore cannot be achieved simply by allowing each country equal numbers of each kind of weapon. Differences in the state of weapon technology in each country also complicate agreement. Any limits set in the treaty, moreover, must be verifiable by each country without resort to on-site inspection of the adversary's forces. The Soviet Union, a closed society, always has resisted allowing outside inspectors onto its soil. The treaty seeks to resolve such difficulties by establishing limits on weapon launchers: missile silos, submarine tubes and manned bombers. Launchers can be counted relatively easily by means of satellite intelligence, electronic monitoring and related procedures. Sub-ceilings limit the number of missiles that can be equipped with multiple warheads and the number of bombers that can be outfitted with cruise missiles — small pilotless aircraft, relatively slow but deadly accurate. In addition, special provisions forbid either country from outfitting any particular missile type with more warheads than it already has tested on that particular type; and each side is prohibited from developing more than one new land-based missile. The overall ceiling on strategic launchers is to decline in the course of the treaty, which runs through 1985, to 2,250. Within that ceiling, each side may equip 1,320 land- and sea-based missiles with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs) or bombers with cruise missiles. Within the 1,320 limit, 1,200 missiles may be equipped with MIRVs. And within the 1,200 limit, 820 land-based inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) may be MIRVed. 
A protocol to the treaty, which would expire at the end of 1981, bans the deployment or flight testing of a land-based mobile missile. The protocol also forbids deployment, but not testing, of land- and sea-launched cruise missiles with ranges over 360 miles. A statement of principles, finally, commits each party to begin a new round of strategic arms talks — SALT III — once SALT II is ratified. SALT III, the principles state, should lead to “significant reductions” in each side's strategic arsenal. Questioning of Treaty's Aim to Reduce Arms When Dean Rusk was Secretary of State in the very early days of the strategic arms talks, he used to tell colleagues that SALT probably would become “history's longest permanent floating crap game.” He meant, apparently, that in a world of rapid political and technological change the two superpowers never would be able to reach a completely final and definitive disarmament agreement. The best they could do would be to adapt a series of agreements to the needs of the time. Some critics of the arms negotiating process have a completely negative view. Alva Myrdal, Sweden's former minister of disarmament, sees it as a charade the superpowers stage to improve their images in the world.” Other analysts share the view that arms negotiations have failed, but they attribute the problem not to insincerity but to inevitable consequences of the negotiating process itself. “Nothing in the history of arms control efforts suggests,” one such analyst has written, “that force levels can be sensibly determined in collusion with a political adversary.” To the contrary, “debates focused on military hardware between potential enemies tend to exacerbate tensions and generate more forces,” since “weapons systems acquired to support negotiating positions invariably become permanent components of force structure.” Examples of the SALT process encouraging arms buildups rather than reductions are legion, according to some reports. The U.S. Trident submarine program is said to have been accelerated because the United States wanted it as a “bargaining chip” in its strategic arms negotiations, and former Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger publicly acknowledged that he had supported development of the cruise missile as a means of strengthening the U.S. bargaining position. The very high ceilings on strategic weapons in SALT II suggest that the new treaty, like its predecessor, may have aggravated rather than ameliorated the arms rivalry. Two or three hundred strategically placed hydrogen bombs could virtually eradicate the entire urban population of either the Soviet Union or the United States, and yet the treaty allows each side thousands of missiles and tens of thousands of warheads. Other experts insist, however, that the net effect of SALT II is beneficial. Rep. Les Aspin, D-Wis., a leading congressional critic of big military budgets, concluded in a study issued early last year that the Soviet Union “would become far more [Aspin's emphasis] powerful without the constraints of the prospective agreement.” According to a Pentagon estimate obtained by The Washington Post, the nation's taxpayers might have to spend $80 billion rather than $50 billion on strategic arms if the new treaty is rejected. Debates as to whether Americans would be better or worse off without the treaty are necessarily inconclusive. Paul Warnke, director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in 1977–78, admitted last fall that while he personally believed SALT II would save the United States money, it was impossible to “point to some form of saving.” The Carter administration claims it would have preferred deeper cuts in strategic arms, such as it proposed in the spring of 1977, but it insists that the treaty nonetheless is a satisfactory agreement and that ratification is in the national interest. President Carter told the American Newspaper Publishers Association on April 25, in a speech to prepare the public for the imminent announcement of agreement on SALT II: “We need it because it will contribute to a more peaceful world — and to our national security.” Others challenge Carter's argument. Eugene V. Rostow, a former State Department official in the Johnson administration, fears that the treaty — like the naval agreements of the 1920s — may lull the United States into a false complacency and leave the country dangerously exposed to a Soviet attack. Rostow, currently a Yale law professor who is executive board chairman of the Committee on the Present Danger, an organization opposing SALT II, recalled recently that the Washington Naval Treaty of 1922 “did not prevent Pearl Harbor.” Hard-Liners' National Security Arguments Soviet strategic forces, the hard-line critics complain, include a large number of heavy missiles which can be equipped under the terms of SALT II with more warheads than the largest U.S. ICBMs. The Soviet “Backfire” bomber, moreover, is excluded from the treaty's limits even though it theoretically could attack the U.S. mainland. Before long, these critics warn, Soviet missiles will be able to destroy the entire U.S. land-based missile force in a devastating first strike, and the United States might be reluctant to retaliate for fear of provoking an attack on U.S. cities. Merely the threat of a disabling first strike could materially further Soviet interests in delicate parts of the world. If the United States were to rise to the Soviet threat, according to the same line of thinking, it would have no trouble equalling and surpassing its rival's strength. The United States spends a much smaller proportion of its national wealth on defense than its adversary does, and it could afford to spend much more. U.S. allies such as Japan and West Germany are among the world's top economic powers and also could contribute much more to the free world's defense, and China could be enlisted in an anti-Soviet alliance. Above all, the United States could exploit its lead in high technology to recover strategic superiority over Russia. Accelerated development of weapons such as the heavy “M-X” missile and the cruise missile, for example, could put America well ahead. Especially important is the future of the M-X, a U.S. heavy missile under development and slated for mobile deployment. Key congressional aides who support SALT II say it is doomed unless Carter unequivocally commits himself to development of M-X. Carter may also be pressed to begin production of a new version of the FB-111, as a counter to the Soviet Backfire, and to deploy weapons to balance Soviet medium-range missiles. An anti-treaty group, Coalition for Peace Through Strength, includes 190 members of Congress and expresses a view that is often heard in the military. At a news conference sponsored by the coalition on April 11, a former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Adm. Thomas Moorer, expressed a view shared by many of his colleagues: After 45 years in uniform, I have never been so concerned about the state of the military balance as I am today. I am not saying that tomorrow we are likely to have Soviet five-megaton warheads raining down upon us. What I am trying to stress to you is the disastrous psychological effect that the Soviet military buildup will have on the American position around the world in the next 10 years. Defenders of the treaty concede that the Russians have bolstered their forces, and Carter acknowledged in his speech on April 25 that “at some future point, they could achieve a strategic advantage.” But Carter argues that the treaty leaves the United States free to respond to the Soviet challenge in all important respects, and that he personally has every intention of doing whatever is necessary. Various mobile basing systems, designed to assure the invulnerability of U.S. ICBMs, are under consideration. While the treaty protocol limits deployment of these weapons, administration officials indicate, they would in any case not be ready for use before the protocol expired. If the United States were to insist on restricting Russia's Backfire bomber, the Soviet Union might equally insist on placing numerical limits on U.S. forward-based aircraft, which theoretically could attack Russia. Dispute Over Ability to Verify Soviet Activity SALT II, Carter has stressed repeatedly, “is not a favor we are doing for the Soviet Union.” If the treaty is not in the U.S. national interest, then it should be rejected, regardless of what Russia may be doing in various parts of the world. If on the other hand it is balanced and adequately verifiable, Carter insists, then it should be ratified. “We are confident,” President Carter said in his speech on April 25, “that no significant violation of the treaty could take place without the United States detecting it.” The administration's confidence, he went on to explain, derives from “the size and nature of the activities we must monitor and the many effective and sophisticated intelligence collection systems we possess.” Submarines and missile launchers are very large and are easily detectable from U.S. satellites such as “Big Bird,” which circles the earth once every 90 minutes and has cameras that can detect objects almost as small as tennis balls. Monitoring the number of warheads that can be placed on missiles may be somewhat more problematic, experts agree, especially with the loss of U.S. intelligence stations in Iran. The information that had been obtained from Iranian radar installations had been especially useful in determining what kinds of missiles were being tested and whether they were being tested with multiple warheads. The director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Adm. Stansfield Turner, is reported to have told the Senate Intelligence Committee on April 10 that regaining all the capabilities lost in Iran could take up to five years. Secretary of Defense Harold Brown has stressed, however, that “the question is not if we will reinstitute” the capabilities lost in Iran “but how, where, and how quickly we can do it.” SALT foes also fear the Soviet Union might develop some new weapon which the treaty does not cover and which U.S. intelligence officials are not even looking for. Aviation Week Editor Robert Hotz contends that the CIA has a “miserable track record on discerning both the nature and significance of new Soviet technological developments.” The Carter administration argues that monitoring of Soviet activities will be easier with SALT than without. The treaty requires the Soviet Union to inform the United States how many weapons it has deployed under each ceiling and to notify the United States of plans to test long-range land-based missiles, unless they are single tests along established ranges. An understanding accompanying the treaty specifies that it would be a violation of the agreement to encode data transmitted from missile tests when such information is relevant to verification. The agreement forbids interference with national means of verification. Go to top Arms Control Efforts Since 1945 Collapse of Baruch Plan; Test Ban Treaty At the end of World War II the United States and the Soviet Union confronted each other as leaders of two hostile systems, capitalism and communism. Deep-seated suspicions of each other had not been overcome by the wartime alliance. Though everybody recognized in 1945 that the atomic bomb posed an altogether new kind of threat to humanity, lingering distrust hindered open discussion between the two major powers. Such suspicions doomed the first proposals made for nuclear disarmament. On June 14, 1946, Bernard M. Baruch presented an American plan for the abolition of atomic weapons to the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission. The Baruch Plan called upon all nations to transfer to an international authority ownership and control of all atomic materials and activities; once the authority was established, nations already possessing atomic weapons (then only the United States) would destroy them. But the Soviet Union apparently was suspicious of a plan that required it to give up its own development of atomic weapons before the United States had discarded its own. Five days after the Baruch Plan was announced, the Russians made an alternative proposal which would have required the United States to abolish its nuclear arsenal before an international authority was established. The numerical superiority of Soviet ground forces, among other things, made this idea unacceptable to the United States. From the late 1940s to the mid-1950s, both the United States and the Soviet Union issued numerous proposals for “general and complete disarmament,” all of which came to nought. A series of special committees and commissions were set up under U.N. auspices to formulate disarmament proposals, but they too produced no agreement. Often the disarmament initiatives taken by the superpowers, as a U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency study was to point out, were “difficult to distinguish from efforts to gain propaganda advantages.” By the mid-1950s many people were becoming disenchanted with the usual approaches to disarmament, and a variety of factors began to favor a fresh approach. In 1953 Stalin died, and a less repressive leadership emerged in the Kremlin. The man who soon established himself at the top, Nikita S. Khrushchev, enunciated the doctrine of coexistence, a radical departure from established Soviet ideology. Meanwhile, with the development of the hydrogen bomb and the inter-continental missile, people began to foresee an era in which whole societies could be virtually annihilated in a matter of minutes. Radiation fallout from nuclear tests caused growing concern, not only in the United States but all over the world. As early as 1954, Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru urged a suspension of tests, but it was to take nearly a decade before the superpowers could reach agreement on even a more limited version of what Nehru suggested. Technical discussions between the superpowers dragged on for years at Geneva, and when agreement at last seemed at hand — in 1960 — Khrushchev abruptly broke off a Paris summit conference with President Eisenhower after an American U-2 spy plane was shot down over Russia. It was only in the wake of the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, which brought the superpowers to the brink of nuclear war, that agreement finally was reached on a partial test ban treaty. The accord, signed in August 1963 by the United States, Russia and Britain, banned nuclear tests in the atmosphere, outer space, and under water. The partial test ban negotiated by Khrushchev and President Kennedy ended fallout from nuclear explosives, but as an arms control measure was somewhat disappointing. Both sides stepped up underground testing, and they continued to bolster strategic forces. Even so, the partial test ban demonstrated that the United States and the Soviet Union could reach agreement on an arms control treaty, provided it did not conflict with interests each country regarded as vital. In many ways, the test ban was the prototype of a nuclear-age treaty. Like the SALT treaty today, it was subject to the opinions not only of politicians and diplomats but also of soldiers and scientists. SALT I Origins at 1967 Summit Meeting During the years following conclusion of the test ban concern mounted about the destabilizing effects development and deployment of an anti-ballistic missile (ABM) system might have on the “balance of terror.” If either side were to develop a system which could defend its territory against the adversary's missiles, then it would be capable in theory of initiating and winning a nuclear war. On the other hand, development of a workable ABM involved extremely complicated technical problems, which might in the end prove to be unsolved. At very least, ABM development threatened to unleash a very costly and possibly a very dangerous new round of arms racing. At a meeting between President Johnson and Premier Aleksei N. Kosygin in 1967 at Glassboro, N.J., Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara urged the Soviet leader to consider an ABM ban, but without apparent success. The Russians soon reconsidered their position, however, and signaled their willingness to discuss an ABM treaty provided offensive systems also were limited. On June 27, 1968 Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko informed the Supreme Soviet — the legislative body — of the Kremlin's readiness to discuss “mutual limitation and subsequent reduction of strategic means of delivery of nuclear weapons, both offensive and defensive, including antiballistic missiles.” Five days later, Johnson announced the two governments would open strategic arms limitation talks. Nixon's ABM Reversal and 1972 Agreement President Nixon entered office in 1969 with grave reservations about his predecessor's arms control efforts and was predisposed to proceed with deployment of a U.S. ABM system. But from a technical point of view, an ABM was looking increasingly unattractive, as a successful system would be required — in effect — to “hit a bullet with a bullet.” No matter how many ABM missiles one side built, the other could simply swamp its defenses with additional offensive missiles. Operation of an ABM system, moreover, would require large radar installations which themselves would be vulnerable to attack. Economic considerations also were beginning to threaten the ABM. With opposition to the Vietnam War growing and its costs rising, Congress had launched an economy drive and was beginning for the first time in a decade to scrutinize new weapons requests carefully. In August 1969, Vice President Spiro T. Agnew had to cast a tie-breaking vote in the Senate to prevent Congress from cutting ABM funding. In these circumstances, Nixon authorized strategic arms negotiations. His national security adviser, Henry A. Kissinger, proceeded to gather control over the negotiations in his own hands, and with the skill and boldness for which he was to become famous he gradually overcame opposition to an agreement within the U.S. government. In May 1972, President Nixon traveled to Moscow to sign, amid much pomp and splendor, the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement on Offensive Arms — the SALT I accords. Ratification of the ABM treaty occurred with remarkable ease. The Senate approved the treaty by a decisive vote of 88 to 2 on Aug. 3, 1972, just three months after it had been concluded. The Interim Agreement in principle did not require congressional authorization, since it was an executive agreement and not a treaty, but Nixon submitted it to both the House and Senate for approval by ordinary majorities. It proved to be more controversial than the treaty, primarily because it allowed the Soviet Union to keep a larger number of offensive missiles than the United States had deployed. Several senators proposed modifications to the agreement. The most important was an amendment sponsored by Sen. Henry M. Jackson, D-Wash., which the Nixon administration accepted, stating that any future permanent strategic arms treaty should “not limit the United States to levels of intercontinental strategic forces inferior to” those of the Soviet Union, but rather should be based on “the principle of equality.” Ford and Brezhnev's Vladivostok Guidelines In November 1974, President Ford met with Brezhnev at Vladivostok and agreed on overall guidelines for a SALT II agreement. These guidelines set a ceiling on strategic delivery vehicles — missiles and bombers — of 2,400, and a sub-limit of 1,320 on missiles which could be equipped with multiple warheads. But disagreements on what other systems to include in a treaty, notably the Soviet Backfire and the U.S. cruise missile, impeded conclusion of a final accord. As the 1976 election approached, moreover, Ford became increasingly fearful of attacks from conservative Republicans on his arms negotiations. The Vladivostok ceilings were widely criticzed as being excessively high, and when Carter took office he had committed himself strongly to the goal of nuclear disarmament. During his inaugural address of Jan. 20, 1977, some of the most enthusiastic applause followed his remarks. “We pledge perseverance and wisdom in our effort to limit the world's armaments to those necessary for each nation's own domestic safety. And we will move this year toward our ultimate goal — the elimination of all nuclear weapons from this earth.” Two months later, Secretary of State Vance went to Moscow with a hastily formulated proposal for deep arms cuts, which the Soviet Union rejected out of hand. Foreign Minister Gromyko charged that the United States was trying to win “unilateral advantages,” and apparently his colleagues in the Kremlin were upset also about strong statements Carter had issued on human rights in the Soviet Union and the public style of Carter's diplomacy. Talks resumed subsequently in private and on terms more acceptable to Moscow, and what finally has emerged after two years resembles the Vladivostok guidelines much more closely than the initial Carter proposal. Important modifications to the Vladivostok agreement include the reduction of the overall ceiling from 2,400 to 2,250 launchers, and the addition of limits on outfitting of missiles with multiple warheads. Go to top The Coming Ratification Debate Alignments and Influences in U.S. Senate The Constitution states in Article II that the president “shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided that two thirds of the Senators present concur ….” Thus a treaty, unlike an ordinary piece of legislation, requires not a simple majority but a two-thirds vote — but in one house only, the Senate. If all 100 senators are present, 67 votes are required for ratification — and only 34 votes for rejection. The Carter administration is sure to have a harder time winning Senate approval of SALT II than the Nixon administration had in getting the 1972 ABM Treaty ratified. To some extent divisions over the new treaty follow conservative and liberal lines, with Republicans more prominently represented among treaty opponents. But some Republicans are known to feel that SALT should not be allowed to become a strictly partisan issue. Some Democrats who are considered liberal on domestic issues — most notably Sen. Jackson — are among the treaty's most influential critics. Several dovish advocates of disarmament say the treaty does not go far enough, and Carter's claim that he sought deeper arms cuts strike them as hollow. Three prominent members of this group are Sens. George S. McGovern, D-S.D., Mark O. Hatfield, R-Ore., and William Proxmire, D-Wis. The three informed Carter in March that they would “reserve the right to vote against any SALT proposal that does not fundamentally curb the arms race.” Sen. Alan Cranston, D-Calif., the majority whip, reported on May 3 he had counted 20 senators solidly against ratification, 10 leaning against, 40 leaning heavily in favor, 10 possibly in favor, and 20 unpredictable. The Senate leaders of both parties, Robert C. Byrd, D-W.Va., and Howard H. Baker, R-Tenn., are undecided and their final decisions no doubt will strongly affect others. On technical issues, Sen. Nunn of Georgia is expected to be influential among southern Democrats, and Sen. John Glenn, D-Ohio, will be listened to with respect on verification questions. As a former astronaut, he is believed to have a considerable understanding of the technicalities of satellite intelligence. The opinions of several individuals outside of the Senate are expected to be quite influential. CIA Director Turner's views will be paid close regard, and, according to columnists Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, he “has left a strong impression that he does not regard his role as a seller of SALT.” The Joint Chiefs of Staff are also likely to command attention; a former Chief of Naval Operations, Adm. Elmo R. Zumwalt Jr., has said he was “fully informed” on their position and they have “deep reservations” about the treaty. In fact, it has been asserted that Sen. Jackson and the Joint Chiefs played a major role in shaping the arms proposal Carter sent to Moscow in 1977 as a propaganda move calculated to be rejected. Former Secretary of State Kissinger, who may turn out to be the most influential of all, has promised to make a “comprehensive statement that addresses all the issues” once he has studied the treaty text. Lobbying Efforts by Advocates and Foes The administration is engaged in an intensive lobbying effort to win public support for the SALT treaty, and indeed this effort itself has become an element in the ratification debate. Sen. Barry M. Goldwater, R-Ariz., has publicized the fact that executive branch officials spent over $600,000 last year traveling around the country to speak on the treaty. The politically conservative Heritage Foundation, noting that nearly 100 officials have made such trips, has asserted that the CIA has “about half as many senior analysts evaluating Soviet strategic programs.” Backing up the administration's public relations efforts is an independent group, “Americans for SALT,” organized in 1978 to generate grass-roots support for the treaty. The group's advisory board includes Clark Clifford (former Secretary of Defense), Townsend Hoopes (former Under Secretary of the Air Force), and Charles Yost (former U.N. ambassador). Scientists, especially those affiliated with the Federation of American Scientists, an organization founded by those who built the atomic bomb in World War II, traditionally have made important contributions to the discussion of arms control issues. But today the federation is divided on SALT, with its members unable to reach a consensus on all the pertinent considerations that must be taken into account. For this reason, Washington commentator Richard Rovere observed in The New Yorker, politicians are having to “turn for advice to a small group of twentieth-century gurus who have made something of a specialty of the arcane calculus of nuclear weapons and delivery systems and of nuclear-age diplomacy.” Among the gurus who are likely to figure prominently in the Senate debate are Paul H. Nitze, Herbert Scoville Jr., and possibly Paul C. Warnke. Warnke, a “dove” who encountered Senate opposition to his confirmation as director of the disarmament agency in 1977, may work quietly only in the background; he is thought to be a liability among senators who are leaning against the treaty. Scoville, a former deputy director of the Central Intelligence Agency, may therefore take his place as leading spokesman outside the government for the administration's position. The leading spokesman against the treaty, on the other hand, is without doubt Nitze. He has held top national security posts and is the driving force behind the Committee on the Present Danger. Public Opinion Factor in Senate Deliberations Public support for a strategic arms limitation treaty has been consistently high since 1975. Most polls taken by reputable survey organizations during the past year have found that over two-thirds of the Americans questioned, and sometimes as much as 80 percent of the public, favor a treaty in principle. A National Poll conducted by NBC News and the Associated Press in April 1979 showed that 68 percent of those asked said they supported “the general idea of a new pact,” compared to 71 percent in March. Twenty-two percent opposed an agreement, up from 18 percent in March. A more recent poll conducted for The Washington Post, however, suggests public support for SALT may be somewhat weaker than had been generally believed. Confronted with the question, “Do you think the United States should try to maintain military superiority over Russia, or do you approve of an arms limitation treaty that would leave the United States and Russia as equal as possible in military strength?” just 50 percent favored the treaty and 42 percent wanted to maintain superiority. About 53 percent thought the United States should “get tougher” with Russia. Sen. William V. Roth, R-Del., has said public opinion should not have an important influence on his final decision. “I've always said that, on a security issue that is this complex, the people of Delaware basically want me to exercise my best judgment.” Many undecided senators, no doubt, share Roth's assessment, and the views of influential colleagues and experts may weigh far more heavily in their deliberations than the polls. Current patterns in public opinion would seem to bear out Roth's conclusion that the American people would prefer to have their elected representatives exercise their best judgment on the treaty. But if the Senate were to reject it, no doubt there would be considerable disappointment at losing an agreement which three presidents had negotiated and which the Soviet Union had accepted. Political commentators David Broder and Richard Rovere have suggested that repudiation of the treaty could provide Carter with just the issue he needs to rally liberal Democrats to his cause in 1980, and many senators may have second thoughts as to whether they wish to give the beleaguered president an opportunity of this kind. Go to top Bibliography Books Bechhoefer, Bernard C., Postwar Negotiations for Arms Control, Brookings Institution, 1961. The Boston Study Group, The Price of Defense, New York Times Books, 1979. Collins, John M. and Cordesman, Anthony H., Imbalance of Power: An Analysis of Shifting U.S.-Soviet Military Strengths, Presidio, 1978. Myrdal, Alva, The Game of Disarmament, Praeger, 1976. Newhouse, John, Cold Dawn: The Story of SALT, Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1973. Articles Arms Control Today, selected issues. The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, selected issues. The Defense Monitor, selected issues. Lodal, Jan M., “SALT II and American Security,” Foreign Affairs, winter 1978–79. Lodgaard, Sverre, “Functions of SALT,” Journal of Peace Research, 1977 No. 1. Marshall, Eliot, “SALT Supporters of Two Minds on Treaty,” Science, June 1, 1979. “Now the Great Debate,” Time, May 21, 1979. “Pass the SALT: An Interview With Paul Warnke,” New York Review of Books, June 14, 1979. Rostow, Eugene V., “The Case Against SALT II,” Commentary, February 1979. Rovere, Richard, “Affairs of State,” The New Yorker, May 28, 1979. Reports and Studies Aspin, Les, “Salt II or No SALT,” Washington, D.C., January 1978. Editorial Research Reports: “Politics of Strategic Arms Negotiations,” 1977 Vol. I, p. 349; “Treaty Ratification,” 1972 Vol. II, p. 519. U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, selected reports and studies. U.S. Department of State, selected reports and studies. Go to top Footnotes Go to top Special Focus ABM. anti-ballistic missile ALCM. air-launched cruise missile ASBM. air-to-surface ballistic missile ASW. anti-submarine warfare CM. cruise missile CONUS. continental United States FBS. forward-based systems FRODS. functionally-related observable differences GLCM. ground-launched cruise missiles HB. heavy bomber ICBM. intercontinental ballistic missile IRBM. intermediate-range ballistic missile KT. kiloton MAP. multiple aim-point MIRV. multiple, independently-targetable reentry vehicle MLBM. modern, large ballistic missile MRBM. medium-range ballistic missile MRV. multiple reentry vehicle MT. megaton MW/CM. multiple-warhead cruise missile MX. missile experimental NTM. national technical means ODs. observable differences PBV. post-boost vehicle RV. reentry vehicle SALT. Strategic Arms Limitation Talks SAM. surface-to-air missile SCC. Standing Consultative Commission SLBM. submarine-launched ballistic missile SLCM. sea-launched cruise missile SNDV. strategic nuclear delivery vehicle SRAM. short-range attack missile SSBN. nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine President Nixon and Chairman Brezhnev signed two strategic arms limitation pacts in Moscow on May 26, 1972. One was the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (ABMs), and the other was technically an executive agreement placing a numerical freeze on U.S. and Soviet missile launchers for five years at roughly the existing levels. Although both agreements are sometimes referred to as SALT I, the tendency now is to speak of SALT I in terms of the second agreement — on offensive weaponry. The other is usually called the ABM treaty. That treaty limited each side to one ABM site for defense of Moscow and of Washington, and to one site for the defense of an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) “field,” or facility — in America, at Grand Forks, N.D. No Washington-area ABM site was ever put into operation, however, and the Grand Forks installation was shut down soon after the treaty was concluded. The agreement on offensive weaponry limited intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) to the number under construction or deployed as of July 1, 1972 — about 1,618 for the Soviet Union and 1,054 for the United States — and froze deployment of nuclear submarines at existing levels — 62 Russian and 44 American. The Senate's rejection in 1920 of the Treaty of Versailles, which embodied peace terms with Germany and the Covenant of the League of Nations, earned it a reputation as the graveyard of treaties. The overall record indicates that the reputation is not deserved. The Senate has concurred in scores of treaties during the nation's history and rejected only 11. They were: | Date of vote | Country | Vote | Subject | | April 17, 1844 | Germany | 26–18 | Reciprocity | | June 27, 1860 | Spain | 26–17 | Cuban Claims Convention | | June 1, 1870 | Hawaii | 20–19 | Reciprocity | | Jan. 5, 1883 | Mexico | 33–20 | Claims Convention | | April 20, 1886 | Mexico | 32–26 | Claims Convention | | May 5, 1897 | Great Britain | 43–26 | Arbitration | | March 19, 1920 | Multilateral | 49–35 | Treaty of Versailles | | Jan. 18, 1927 | Turkey | 50–34 | Amity and Commerce | | March 14, 1934 | Canada | 46–42 | St. Lawrence Waterway | | Jan. 29, 1935 | Multilateral | 52–36 | Adherence to World Court | | May 26, 1960 | Multilateral | 49–30 | Sea Law Convention Protocol | However, the Senate has subjected scores of treaties to amendments, reservations, conditions and qualifications — some of them added at the request of the president but sometimes over his objections. In the absence of any constitutional provision for or against such action, the Senate has claimed authority to modify treaties after negotiations since the time of the Jay Treaty of 1794, resolving questions with Great Britain that threatened to renew the War of Independence. On two occasions, in 1869 and 1901, the Supreme Court sustained the power of the Senate to amend treaties. In the case of SALT II, its backers fear that amendments or reservations or “understandings” would have the effect of killing the treaty unless they were so benign they did not modify its substance. Secretary of State Vance has said the treaty is a “very carefully crafted document” of “interrelated and intertwined” parts. “Therefore, to amend any part runs a grave risk of killing the treaty completely.” At weekly intervals for long stretches of time, a by-now familiar scene is repeated at the Emperor Franz-Joseph's old imperial palace in Vienna. A fleet of limousines conveys diplomats from 19 countries to the opulent setting where they discuss, or go through the motions of discussing, East-West troop reductions in Central Europe. The Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) negotiations, as the talks are formally known, have been conducted since the fall of 1973. For almost as long, they have been stalled by an inability of the NATO countries and their Warsaw Pact (communist) counterparts to agree on what the existing troop strength behind the Iron Curtain really is. Until agreement on that matter can be reached, force reductions seem to be out of the question. There is some belief that these talks will move off dead-center if the SALT II treaty is ratified. A. G. Friedman, who formerly served with the U.S. delegation to the Vienna talks, wrote recently: “MBFR is a nice follow-on subject since it deals with actual U.S. and Soviet soldiers as well as the larger issue of disarmament in Europe …. Clearly, both nations [the United States and Russia] view MBFR as the likely place for delicate East-West discussions [to continue].” Go to top
Document APA Citation
Sweet, W. (1979). Strategic arms debate. Editorial research reports 1979 (Vol. I). http://library.cqpress.com/cqresearcher/cqresrre1979060800
Document ID: cqresrre1979060800
Document URL: http://library.cqpress.com/cqresearcher/cqresrre1979060800
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