Report Outline
Compulsory Transfer Vs. Self-Determination
Intra-Axis and Nazi-Soviet Transfers
Nazi Mass Transfers in Western Europe
Population Transfers After World War Ii
Compulsory Transfer Vs. Self-Determination
National Minorities as Breeders of War
Compulsory Transfer of European minorities from state to state—a policy rejected by Allied leaders after the last war—is widely accepted today as an essential part of the postwar security program. Moscow's approval of such a policy has been demonstrated by its exchange of peoples with Germany, after the Nazi-Soviet partition of Poland in 1939, and more recently by the agreements for future transfers of populations negotiated by two republics of the U. S. S. R. (White Russia and the Ukraine) with the Polish Committee of National Liberation.
At Versailles in 1919 an attempt was made to solve the problem of national minorities—congregations in one country of the nationals of another country—in accordance with President Wilson's principle of self-determination. New states were created, plebiscites were ordered, and a code was set up for the protection of minority groups. None of these measures proved adequate. With the development of radio communication, home governments were able to give constant and immediate direction to their nationals in other states, and discontented minorities continued to provide excuses for aggression.
The peace conference after World War II must find different means of dealing with minority problems. In addition it must remove new centers of infection established by the Nazis throughout Europe during the war. Three types of German minorities must be pushed back into the Reich: (1) the so-called “intruded” Germans who have been sent into occupied countries; (2) old German settlers who betrayed the countries in which they were resident into the Nazi camp; (3) Germans living in areas that may be taken from Germany by members of the United Nations. For these reasons responsible European leaders believe adoption of a postwar program of compulsory migration is essential to the achievement of world security. |
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Dec. 22, 1989 |
A Primer on German Reunification |
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Apr. 19, 1985 |
German Reconciliation |
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Feb. 25, 1983 |
West Germany's ‘Missile’ Election |
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Jan. 14, 1970 |
German Reconciliation |
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Jan. 29, 1969 |
West German Prosperity |
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Mar. 30, 1966 |
German Border Question and Reunification |
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Aug. 18, 1965 |
West German Election, 1965 |
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Feb. 24, 1965 |
War Guilt Expiation |
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Jul. 01, 1964 |
German Question |
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Sep. 01, 1961 |
Captive East Germany |
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Aug. 23, 1961 |
West German Election, 1961 |
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May 04, 1960 |
Berlin Question |
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Dec. 24, 1958 |
Berlin Crisis and German Reunification |
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Aug. 21, 1957 |
German Election, 1957 |
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Oct. 19, 1955 |
European Security |
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Jun. 15, 1955 |
Germany and the Balance of Power |
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Oct. 19, 1954 |
German Rearmament |
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Jan. 19, 1954 |
West German Recovery |
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Mar. 12, 1953 |
Harassed Berlin |
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Apr. 26, 1950 |
German Problem |
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Feb. 18, 1948 |
Rehabilitation of the Ruhr |
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Oct. 23, 1946 |
Future of Germany |
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Nov. 25, 1944 |
Transfers of Populations |
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Nov. 01, 1940 |
Economic Controls in Nazi Germany |
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Mar. 09, 1939 |
Foreign Trade in German Economy |
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Apr. 02, 1936 |
Germany's Post-War European Relations |
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Nov. 02, 1934 |
The Coming Saab Plebiscite |
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Apr. 23, 1931 |
The Austro-German Customs Union Project |
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Feb. 05, 1929 |
The Rhineland Problem |
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Nov. 07, 1924 |
German National Elections December, 1924 |
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Apr. 30, 1924 |
The German National Elections |
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