Report Outline
Special Focus
Overview
For all the fanfare that accompanied the signing of the first U.S.-Soviet arms control agreement in eight years, the treaty to ban intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) has posed as many questions about the defense of Europe as it has resolved. By reducing the nuclear component of the superpowers' arsenals on the continent, the INF agreement has focused attention on conventional, or non-nuclear, forces. While all 15 U.S. allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) endorse the treaty, which was signed Dec. S in Washington, they a]so agree that the withdrawal of 2,800 “Euromissiles” and the prospect of deep cuts in the superpowers' strategic nuclear forces make adequate conventional strength more urgent than ever.
By nearly all accounts, the seven-nation Warsaw Pact enjoys a substantial numerical advantage over NATO in conventional forces. At the same time, budgetary constraints in the United States and in Europe will make it more difficult to correct that imbalance. For this reason, support is growing for a new set of negotiations aimed at reducing the level of conventional forces deployed in Europe by NATO and the East bloc. “We and the Soviet Union are pretty much agreed to start conventional stability talks sometime early next year,” says Matthew Murphy, a spokesman for the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, which advises the president on arms control policy. Unlike the negotiations over nuclear weapons, which have been conducted between the superpowers alone, the conventional weapons talks will involve all 23 members of the two alliances. “We will consult with our NATO allies and be sure all are agreed on specific proposals to be presented to the Soviets,” Murphy says.
But there are obstacles to reaching such a consensus that make the official timetable uncertain. Some of the West European allies fear that the removal of U.S. medium-range nuclear weapons from their territory is the first phase of a reduction in America s defense commitment to Europe. |
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Arms Control and Disarmament |
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Feb. 14, 2020 |
The New Arms Race |
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Dec. 13, 2013 |
Chemical and Biological Weapons |
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Mar. 2010 |
Dangerous War Debris |
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Oct. 02, 2009 |
Nuclear Disarmament  |
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Jan. 27, 1995 |
Non-Proliferation Treaty at 25 |
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Dec. 24, 1987 |
Defending Europe |
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Feb. 22, 1985 |
Arms Control Negotiations |
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Jun. 08, 1979 |
Strategic Arms Debate |
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Apr. 09, 1969 |
Prospects for Arms Control |
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Mar. 15, 1961 |
New Approaches to Disarmament |
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Feb. 25, 1960 |
Struggle for Disarmament |
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Nov. 07, 1958 |
Arms Control: 1958 |
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Jun. 11, 1957 |
Inspection for Disarmament |
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Jul. 11, 1955 |
Controlled Disarmament |
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Oct. 09, 1933 |
The Disarmament Conference, 1933 |
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Jan. 05, 1932 |
World Disarmament Conference of 1932 |
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Apr. 08, 1929 |
Efforts Toward Disarmament |
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Mar. 13, 1928 |
The League of Nations and Disarmament |
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Feb. 22, 1927 |
The United States and Disarmament |
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