Controlling Nuclear Proliferation

Report Outline
Fallout from Israeli Raid
Dangers in the Middle East
Carter Administration Record
Outlook for Non-Proliferation
Special Focus

Fallout from Israeli Raid

Objectives of Non-Proliferation System

Fallout from Israel's June 7 attack on Iraq's Osirak nuclear reactor is still settling in capitals all over the world, and it may be years before the raid's ramifications are fully understood. But one thing already is clear. By taking matters into its own hands, Israel indicated its absence of faith in the world's ability to control nuclear proliferation. Israel's skepticism is widely shared. According to Sen. John Glenn, D-Ohio, the “message of the Begin bombing raid on Iraq is that the bedrock of the worldwide non-proliferation effort is more sand than solid.” New York Times columnist James Reston wrote: “Israel's ‘Pearl Harbor’ attack on Iraq merely gives us a glimpse of the coming nightmare if this problem [of nuclear proliferation] is not brought under control.”

The world's system for preventing nuclear proliferation rests on two connected and mutually dependent pillars: (1) the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), under which the nuclear powers pledge not to help other nations acquire atomic weapons and those nations without such weapons promise not to build them in exchange for access to nuclear technology; and (2) the system of international safeguards that are imposed on exported nuclear equipment and on nuclear facilities operated by parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Plainly, the NPT can be relied on only to the extent to which the community of nations supports its objectives and is prepared to enforce its provisions, with sanctions or force of arms where necessary. And even when nations are prepared to give the treaty that kind of support, safeguards are a reliable barrier to proliferation only to the extent they receive adequate funding and professional attention, and only to the extent they cover all relevant activities.

The basic objective of the safeguards system, which is administered by the Vienna-based International Atomic Energy Agency, is to monitor the flow of “fissionable materials” — plutonium and highly enriched uranium — the crucial materials needed for construction of atomic bombs. Agency inspectors make spot checks at safeguarded facilities, after giving the affected countries advance notice. The inspections are intended to provide “timely warning” of a “diversion” of fissionable material from peaceful to military uses. The system is not designed to physically prevent diversions of nuclear material. Rather, it is meant to deter them or, where that fails, to warn the community of nations of potentially dangerous activities.