Report Outline
Parley of Western Powers and Soviets
Communist Conduct in Past Conferences
Red Tactics in International Negotiations
Parley of Western Powers and Soviets
Silence at the White House following President Kennedy's two-hour talk with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko, late in the afternoon of October 6, indicated that East-West negotiations on Berlin and other crisis-laden questions may still be some distance away. The White House meeting was a follow-up to preliminary soundings taken in the course of three long conversations in New York between Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Gromyko. The purpose, on the part of the United States, was to probe for bases of agreement with the Communists not only on Germany but also on Southeast Asia, disarmament and other matters.
While the talks to date have been described as useful and interesting, they have reportedly produced no change in the Soviet wish to confine any formal negotiations to the status of West Berlin and of East Germany. This country seeks consideration of a broad range of issues that have caused deepening division between the Communist nations and the Western powers. A high-level parley may do more harm than good without advance preparations that reveal prospects for fruitful results. Although progress toward that end in the present case is not yet visible, hope persists that justification will be found to go ahead with an East-West foreign ministers' conference, possibly before the end of the year.
Urging of Negotiations to Reduce Risk of War
Pressure for negotiations has been increased by emergence of a real risk of war between the Soviet Union and the West. Sealing of the border between East and West Berlin, Aug. 13, raised the danger signals, and they were added to by Moscow's decision less than three weeks later to resume nuclear testing in the atmosphere. All the time, fear of a new crisis in Southeast Asia lurked in the background. President Kennedy pointed out, in his address to the United Nations General Assembly on Sept. 25, that the cease-fire in Laos was “at best precarious,” and that the approaching end of the rainy season threatened increased Red infiltration of South Viet Nam from neighboring Laotian territory. |
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Sep. 14, 1990 |
The Western Alliance After the Cold War |
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Feb. 10, 1989 |
Soviet Trade: In America's Best Interest? |
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Nov. 01, 1985 |
U.S.-Soviet Summitry |
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Jul. 09, 1982 |
Controlling Scientific Information |
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May 25, 1973 |
Trends in U.S.-Soviet Relations |
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Apr. 05, 1972 |
Russia's Diplomatic Offensive |
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Feb. 09, 1972 |
Trading with Communist Nations |
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Mar. 10, 1971 |
Indian Ocean Policy |
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Apr. 21, 1965 |
Negotiations with Communists |
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Nov. 13, 1963 |
Scientific Cooperation with the Soviet Union |
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Oct. 03, 1963 |
Trade with the Communists |
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Sep. 11, 1963 |
Non-Aggression Pacts and Surprise Attack |
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Oct. 11, 1961 |
East-West Negotiations |
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Mar. 29, 1961 |
Russia and United Nations |
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Aug. 10, 1960 |
Challenged Monroe Doctrine |
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Sep. 02, 1959 |
American-Soviet Trade |
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Jul. 03, 1959 |
Cultural Exchanges with Soviet Russia |
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Aug. 11, 1958 |
Conference Diplomacy |
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Jul. 23, 1958 |
Limited War |
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May 14, 1958 |
Cold War Propaganda |
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Feb. 26, 1958 |
Military Disengagement |
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Feb. 20, 1957 |
Indirect Aggression |
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Jul. 25, 1956 |
Trading with Communists |
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Jan. 11, 1956 |
Economic Cold War |
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Nov. 26, 1954 |
Peaceful Coexistence |
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Dec. 01, 1953 |
Tests of Allied Unity |
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Sep. 18, 1953 |
Negotiating with the Reds |
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Jun. 17, 1953 |
East-West Trade |
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Apr. 12, 1951 |
Non-Military Weapons in Cold-War Offensive |
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Apr. 20, 1949 |
Mediterranean Pact and Near East Security |
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Apr. 28, 1948 |
Trade with Russia |
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Sep. 11, 1946 |
Loyalty in Government |
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Jul. 31, 1946 |
Arctic Defenses |
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Apr. 01, 1943 |
American and British Relations with Russia |
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Feb. 24, 1933 |
Soviet-American Political and Trade Relations |
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Nov. 03, 1931 |
Russian-American Relations |
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Feb. 14, 1924 |
Russian Trade with the United States |
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