East-West Negotiations

October 11, 1961

Report Outline
Parley of Western Powers and Soviets
Communist Conduct in Past Conferences
Red Tactics in International Negotiations

Parley of Western Powers and Soviets

Silence at the White House following President Kennedy's two-hour talk with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko, late in the afternoon of October 6, indicated that East-West negotiations on Berlin and other crisis-laden questions may still be some distance away. The White House meeting was a follow-up to preliminary soundings taken in the course of three long conversations in New York between Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Gromyko. The purpose, on the part of the United States, was to probe for bases of agreement with the Communists not only on Germany but also on Southeast Asia, disarmament and other matters.

While the talks to date have been described as useful and interesting, they have reportedly produced no change in the Soviet wish to confine any formal negotiations to the status of West Berlin and of East Germany. This country seeks consideration of a broad range of issues that have caused deepening division between the Communist nations and the Western powers. A high-level parley may do more harm than good without advance preparations that reveal prospects for fruitful results. Although progress toward that end in the present case is not yet visible, hope persists that justification will be found to go ahead with an East-West foreign ministers' conference, possibly before the end of the year.

Urging of Negotiations to Reduce Risk of War

Pressure for negotiations has been increased by emergence of a real risk of war between the Soviet Union and the West. Sealing of the border between East and West Berlin, Aug. 13, raised the danger signals, and they were added to by Moscow's decision less than three weeks later to resume nuclear testing in the atmosphere. All the time, fear of a new crisis in Southeast Asia lurked in the background. President Kennedy pointed out, in his address to the United Nations General Assembly on Sept. 25, that the cease-fire in Laos was “at best precarious,” and that the approaching end of the rainy season threatened increased Red infiltration of South Viet Nam from neighboring Laotian territory.

ISSUE TRACKER for Related Reports
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Feb. 10, 1989  Soviet Trade: In America's Best Interest?
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Mar. 10, 1971  Indian Ocean Policy
Apr. 21, 1965  Negotiations with Communists
Nov. 13, 1963  Scientific Cooperation with the Soviet Union
Oct. 03, 1963  Trade with the Communists
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Oct. 11, 1961  East-West Negotiations
Mar. 29, 1961  Russia and United Nations
Aug. 10, 1960  Challenged Monroe Doctrine
Sep. 02, 1959  American-Soviet Trade
Jul. 03, 1959  Cultural Exchanges with Soviet Russia
Aug. 11, 1958  Conference Diplomacy
Jul. 23, 1958  Limited War
May 14, 1958  Cold War Propaganda
Feb. 26, 1958  Military Disengagement
Feb. 20, 1957  Indirect Aggression
Jul. 25, 1956  Trading with Communists
Jan. 11, 1956  Economic Cold War
Nov. 26, 1954  Peaceful Coexistence
Dec. 01, 1953  Tests of Allied Unity
Sep. 18, 1953  Negotiating with the Reds
Jun. 17, 1953  East-West Trade
Apr. 12, 1951  Non-Military Weapons in Cold-War Offensive
Apr. 20, 1949  Mediterranean Pact and Near East Security
Apr. 28, 1948  Trade with Russia
Sep. 11, 1946  Loyalty in Government
Jul. 31, 1946  Arctic Defenses
Apr. 01, 1943  American and British Relations with Russia
Feb. 24, 1933  Soviet-American Political and Trade Relations
Nov. 03, 1931  Russian-American Relations
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