Report Outline
Conflict Over Defense Preparations
Defense Concepts Since World War II
Special Problems of Limited War
Conflict Over Defense Preparations
Middle East Demonstration of War Risks
Fear of general war was raised throughout the world by the sudden new crisis in the Middle East. Quickly following the overthrow of the government of Iraq on July 14, U.S. marines were landed in Lebanon and British paratroopers in Jordan to discourage similar Arab nationalist coups in those countries. President Eisenhower in a special message to Congress, July 15, acknowledged that the landings at Beirut might have “serious consequences.” Moscow and Peiping immediately voiced charges of Western aggression.
Secretary of State Dulles told the Senate Appropriations Committee, July 18, that this was “a grave moment in history.” On the same day U.S. Ambassador Raymond A. Hare at Cairo formally warned the United Arab Republic that “Any attack on United States forces by military units of the United Arab Republic or under U.A.R. control could involve grave consequences seriously impairing our relations.” Almost simultaneously the Russian government declared that “The Soviet Union will not rest indifferent to the acts of unprovoked aggression in an area adjacent to its frontiers.”
Soviet Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev, in a message on July 19 calling for immediate convening of a summit conference on the Middle East, took occasion to remind the West that the Russian arsenal included intercontinental missiles. However, Khrushchev agreed that it would be “wiser not to bring the heated atmosphere to a boiling point.” Both Dulles and British Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd had expressed the opinion that the present situation would not lead to open conflict between East and West. But everyone recognized that a false step by either side might usher in the dreaded Third World War. |
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Sep. 14, 1990 |
The Western Alliance After the Cold War |
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Feb. 10, 1989 |
Soviet Trade: In America's Best Interest? |
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Nov. 01, 1985 |
U.S.-Soviet Summitry |
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Jul. 09, 1982 |
Controlling Scientific Information |
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May 25, 1973 |
Trends in U.S.-Soviet Relations |
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Apr. 05, 1972 |
Russia's Diplomatic Offensive |
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Feb. 09, 1972 |
Trading with Communist Nations |
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Mar. 10, 1971 |
Indian Ocean Policy |
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Apr. 21, 1965 |
Negotiations with Communists |
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Nov. 13, 1963 |
Scientific Cooperation with the Soviet Union |
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Oct. 03, 1963 |
Trade with the Communists |
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Sep. 11, 1963 |
Non-Aggression Pacts and Surprise Attack |
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Oct. 11, 1961 |
East-West Negotiations |
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Mar. 29, 1961 |
Russia and United Nations |
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Aug. 10, 1960 |
Challenged Monroe Doctrine |
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Sep. 02, 1959 |
American-Soviet Trade |
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Jul. 03, 1959 |
Cultural Exchanges with Soviet Russia |
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Aug. 11, 1958 |
Conference Diplomacy |
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Jul. 23, 1958 |
Limited War |
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May 14, 1958 |
Cold War Propaganda |
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Feb. 26, 1958 |
Military Disengagement |
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Feb. 20, 1957 |
Indirect Aggression |
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Jul. 25, 1956 |
Trading with Communists |
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Jan. 11, 1956 |
Economic Cold War |
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Nov. 26, 1954 |
Peaceful Coexistence |
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Dec. 01, 1953 |
Tests of Allied Unity |
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Sep. 18, 1953 |
Negotiating with the Reds |
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Jun. 17, 1953 |
East-West Trade |
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Apr. 12, 1951 |
Non-Military Weapons in Cold-War Offensive |
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Apr. 20, 1949 |
Mediterranean Pact and Near East Security |
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Apr. 28, 1948 |
Trade with Russia |
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Sep. 11, 1946 |
Loyalty in Government |
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Jul. 31, 1946 |
Arctic Defenses |
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Apr. 01, 1943 |
American and British Relations with Russia |
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Feb. 24, 1933 |
Soviet-American Political and Trade Relations |
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Nov. 03, 1931 |
Russian-American Relations |
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Feb. 14, 1924 |
Russian Trade with the United States |
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