Report Outline
Korean armistice and east-west trade
Control of Exports to Communist Nations
Controversies Over Trade with Red China
Foreign Interest in East-West Trade
Korean armistice and east-west trade
One wholesome result of a general settlement between the nations of the free world and the Soviet Union, whether achieved by a Big Four conference or by a step-by-step process of accommodation, would be resumption on an expanding scale of trade between the East and the West. An “honorable armistice in Korea” was the first of the deeds for peace asked by President Eisenhower in his Apr. 16 address on foreign policy. If an honorable armistice is now achieved, the next step will be to undertake negotiation of a basic agreement on Korea, and perhaps other Far Eastern questions, at a political conference scheduled to convene 90 days after the cease-fire.
Whether or not included on the formal agenda of the conference, trade policy toward Red China is virtually certain to be brought up in the course of the parley. What induced the Communists, in the truce negotiations, to make the considerable concession involved in abandonment of their demands for forced repatriation of prisoners of war is not known. But if growing economic stringency resulting from the embargoes that have been applied against mainland China played an influential part, as may have been the ease, it stands to reason that Communist negotiators in the political conference will put up a strong fight for removal or substantial modification of existing restrictions on trade with China.
Inasmuch as the U.N. embargo on shipments of arms and strategic materials was invoked as a direct penalty for Chinese aggression and defiance of the United Nations in Korea, its termination might logically follow cessation of the aggression and conclusion of a Korean settlement. The same could be said of the embargo independently imposed by the United States to the extent that it is a total rather than a limited embargo. |
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Sep. 14, 1990 |
The Western Alliance After the Cold War |
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Feb. 10, 1989 |
Soviet Trade: In America's Best Interest? |
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Nov. 01, 1985 |
U.S.-Soviet Summitry |
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Jul. 09, 1982 |
Controlling Scientific Information |
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May 25, 1973 |
Trends in U.S.-Soviet Relations |
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Apr. 05, 1972 |
Russia's Diplomatic Offensive |
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Feb. 09, 1972 |
Trading with Communist Nations |
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Mar. 10, 1971 |
Indian Ocean Policy |
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Apr. 21, 1965 |
Negotiations with Communists |
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Nov. 13, 1963 |
Scientific Cooperation with the Soviet Union |
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Oct. 03, 1963 |
Trade with the Communists |
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Sep. 11, 1963 |
Non-Aggression Pacts and Surprise Attack |
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Oct. 11, 1961 |
East-West Negotiations |
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Mar. 29, 1961 |
Russia and United Nations |
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Aug. 10, 1960 |
Challenged Monroe Doctrine |
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Sep. 02, 1959 |
American-Soviet Trade |
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Jul. 03, 1959 |
Cultural Exchanges with Soviet Russia |
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Aug. 11, 1958 |
Conference Diplomacy |
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Jul. 23, 1958 |
Limited War |
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May 14, 1958 |
Cold War Propaganda |
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Feb. 26, 1958 |
Military Disengagement |
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Feb. 20, 1957 |
Indirect Aggression |
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Jul. 25, 1956 |
Trading with Communists |
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Jan. 11, 1956 |
Economic Cold War |
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Nov. 26, 1954 |
Peaceful Coexistence |
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Dec. 01, 1953 |
Tests of Allied Unity |
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Sep. 18, 1953 |
Negotiating with the Reds |
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Jun. 17, 1953 |
East-West Trade |
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Apr. 12, 1951 |
Non-Military Weapons in Cold-War Offensive |
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Apr. 20, 1949 |
Mediterranean Pact and Near East Security |
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Apr. 28, 1948 |
Trade with Russia |
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Sep. 11, 1946 |
Loyalty in Government |
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Jul. 31, 1946 |
Arctic Defenses |
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Apr. 01, 1943 |
American and British Relations with Russia |
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Feb. 24, 1933 |
Soviet-American Political and Trade Relations |
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Nov. 03, 1931 |
Russian-American Relations |
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Feb. 14, 1924 |
Russian Trade with the United States |
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