Report Outline
Special Focus
Introduction
Will the United States continue to be the major power in Europe? Maybe not. The end of the Cold War has lessened Europe's need for American military protection; the unification of Germany is creating Europe's own superstate; and a relatively rosy independent economic future seems assured for the European Community. But the U.S. response to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, and the European allies' participation in it, indicate that U.S. leadership is still strong—although it is no longer as clear-cut as it once was.
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Overview
It's difficult to say whether Iraqi President Saddam Hussein was surprised by the U.S. reaction to his Aug. 2 invasion of Kuwait. But once President Bush decided to send naval forces to the Persian Gulf and U.S. troops to Saudi Arabia, Saddam may very well have expected the Soviet Union, a longtime ally and supplier of military aid, to denounce “American aggression.” And Saddam also may have assumed that America's West European allies would sit out the crisis. Given their dependence on Middle Eastern oil, the Europeans might have been expected to pay lip service to countering Iraqi aggression, but little more.
Times have changed, however, and Saddam's biggest miscalculation in his plan to annex Kuwait may have been to ignore the shift in world alliances that has occurred during the past year. The Soviet Union, instead of jumping to Saddam's defense, denounced the invasion and joined its fellow members of the United Nations Security Council in supporting economic sanctions against Iraq. It was the first time the U.N. body had agreed to such punitive action since 1977, when it voted for a ban on arms sales to South Africa. The Security Council broke precedent again Aug. 25, when it authorized the naval forces of the United States and other countries to enforce the trade sanctions against Iraq. And Soviet President Mikhail S. Gorbachev reiterated his country's support of U.N. action against Iraq in a joint communiqué after his Sept. 9 meeting with President Bush in Helsinki. |
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Sep. 14, 1990 |
The Western Alliance After the Cold War |
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Feb. 10, 1989 |
Soviet Trade: In America's Best Interest? |
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Nov. 01, 1985 |
U.S.-Soviet Summitry |
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Jul. 09, 1982 |
Controlling Scientific Information |
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May 25, 1973 |
Trends in U.S.-Soviet Relations |
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Apr. 05, 1972 |
Russia's Diplomatic Offensive |
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Feb. 09, 1972 |
Trading with Communist Nations |
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Mar. 10, 1971 |
Indian Ocean Policy |
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Apr. 21, 1965 |
Negotiations with Communists |
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Nov. 13, 1963 |
Scientific Cooperation with the Soviet Union |
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Oct. 03, 1963 |
Trade with the Communists |
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Sep. 11, 1963 |
Non-Aggression Pacts and Surprise Attack |
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Oct. 11, 1961 |
East-West Negotiations |
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Mar. 29, 1961 |
Russia and United Nations |
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Aug. 10, 1960 |
Challenged Monroe Doctrine |
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Sep. 02, 1959 |
American-Soviet Trade |
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Jul. 03, 1959 |
Cultural Exchanges with Soviet Russia |
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Aug. 11, 1958 |
Conference Diplomacy |
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Jul. 23, 1958 |
Limited War |
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May 14, 1958 |
Cold War Propaganda |
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Feb. 26, 1958 |
Military Disengagement |
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Feb. 20, 1957 |
Indirect Aggression |
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Jul. 25, 1956 |
Trading with Communists |
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Jan. 11, 1956 |
Economic Cold War |
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Nov. 26, 1954 |
Peaceful Coexistence |
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Dec. 01, 1953 |
Tests of Allied Unity |
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Sep. 18, 1953 |
Negotiating with the Reds |
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Jun. 17, 1953 |
East-West Trade |
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Apr. 12, 1951 |
Non-Military Weapons in Cold-War Offensive |
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Apr. 20, 1949 |
Mediterranean Pact and Near East Security |
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Apr. 28, 1948 |
Trade with Russia |
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Sep. 11, 1946 |
Loyalty in Government |
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Jul. 31, 1946 |
Arctic Defenses |
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Apr. 01, 1943 |
American and British Relations with Russia |
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Feb. 24, 1933 |
Soviet-American Political and Trade Relations |
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Nov. 03, 1931 |
Russian-American Relations |
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Feb. 14, 1924 |
Russian Trade with the United States |
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