New Approach to Central America

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Introduction

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Overview

On the campaign trail in 1988, candidate George Bush offered nary a word of disagreement with the Central America policies of his predecessor, Ronald Reagan. He would, he indicated, build on Reagan's “successes.” But the early indications from President George Bush are that—in important respects—he intends to pursue a very different approach toward that part of the world. Bush has, for all intents and purposes, scrapped the Reagan administration's seven-year military effort to topple the Marxist government of Nicaragua. And he has taken a much more flexible approach to the problem of the Third World's massive debt.

The Bush administration has handled things in a much different political way, too. Where the Reagan administration often moved unilaterally, and sometimes secretly, the Bush administration appears to be reaching out to include nearly everyone in its foreign policy initiatives—Congress, allies in Central America and the rest of Latin America, other industrialized countries, even the Soviet Union. On the domestic front, the Reagan administration's policies divided the American electorate into pro- and anti-contra aid camps. That led to a major split with Congress and prevented the United States from speaking with one voice on Central America. By contrast, the first aim of Bush's secretary of state, James A. Baker III, was to forge a bipartisan consensus in Congress on Central America: an agreement for continued non-military U.S. aid to the contras (at least until Nicaragua holds presidential elections in February), while giving Congress an interim, informal veto power if the Bush administration undermines a comprehensive peace plan drawn up by five Central American presidents.