Report Outline
Special Focus
Introduction
The Reagan administration's campaign to “rearm America” is at an end, and now the armed services face immediate cutbacks and even deeper ones ahead. With “austerity” as a watchword for the 1990s, the nagging question is whether these budget cuts require strategic changes as well.
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Overview
The next occupant of the White House will inherit a far different kind of defense crisis than the one that propelled Ronald Reagan to the presidency. In 1980, Reagan was elected largely on the basis of his promise to “make America strong again,” He vowed to close the “window of vulnerability” he claimed his predecessors had opened by allowing the Soviet Union to catch up with and then surpass the United States in weapons development and deployment. Together with Defense Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger, Reagan launched his campaign to “rearm America.” They enjoyed broad bipartisan support for their effort: Congress approved $2 trillion in defense spending over the next seven years. This enormous expenditure, the highest peacetime military budget in the post-World War II era, amounted $21,000 for each American household.
The Reagan defense buildup is at an end. Since he replaced Weinberger last November. Defense Secretary Frank C. Carlucci has called for a new approach to meeting the nation's defense needs, Presenting a revised defense spending request in February. Carlucci took the unusual step of asking Congress for less money—a $33 billion cut—than the administration had previously requested for fiscal 1989. He called for the elimination of several weapons programs as well as cuts in manpower while stressing the need to improve the readiness of the shrunken forces. “Simply put.” he told Congress, “the priorities reflected in this budget are people, training, and no artificial program stretches,” by which he meant the deferral of weapons production to later years, a technique the Pentagon frequently uses to meet budget targets. |
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Weapons of Mass Destruction |
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Jul. 29, 2016 |
Modernizing the Nuclear Arsenal |
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Mar. 08, 2002 |
Weapons of Mass Destruction |
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Jan. 31, 1997 |
Chemical and Biological Weapons |
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Jun. 24, 1994 |
Nuclear Arms Cleanup |
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Jun. 05, 1992 |
Nuclear Proliferation |
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Jun. 29, 1990 |
Obstacles to Bio-Chemical Disarmament |
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Apr. 22, 1988 |
The Military Build-Down in the 1990s |
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May 24, 1987 |
Euromissile Negotiations |
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Jul. 11, 1986 |
Chemical Weapons |
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Apr. 27, 1984 |
Reagan's Defense Buildup |
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Jun. 04, 1982 |
Civil Defense |
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Jul. 17, 1981 |
Controlling Nuclear Proliferation |
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Jun. 05, 1981 |
MX Missile Decision |
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Aug. 15, 1980 |
The Neutron Bomb and European Defense |
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Sep. 07, 1979 |
Atomic Secrecy |
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Mar. 17, 1978 |
Nuclear Proliferation |
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May 27, 1977 |
Chemical-Biological Warfare |
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May 13, 1977 |
Politics of Strategic Arms Negotiations |
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Nov. 15, 1974 |
Nuclear Safeguards |
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Jul. 01, 1970 |
Nuclear Balance of Terror: 25 Years After Alamogordo |
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Jun. 18, 1969 |
Chemical–Biological Weaponry |
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Jun. 30, 1965 |
Atomic Proliferation |
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Mar. 21, 1962 |
Nuclear Testing Dilemmas |
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Aug. 16, 1961 |
Shelters and Survival |
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Oct. 12, 1959 |
Chemical-Biological Warfare |
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May 13, 1959 |
Nuclear Test Ban |
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Dec. 04, 1957 |
Scientific Cooperation and Atlantic Security |
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May 15, 1957 |
Changing Defense Concepts |
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Jul. 03, 1956 |
Civil Defense, 1956 |
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Nov. 16, 1955 |
International Arms Deals |
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Oct. 04, 1954 |
Industrial Defense |
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Apr. 15, 1954 |
National Defense Strategy |
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Feb. 10, 1954 |
New Aproaches to Atomic Control |
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Oct. 10, 1953 |
Atomic Information |
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Apr. 11, 1952 |
Biological Warfare |
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Oct. 03, 1951 |
World Arms Race |
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Feb. 04, 1948 |
International Control of Atomic Energy |
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Dec. 06, 1946 |
International Inspection |
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Aug. 27, 1943 |
Gas Warfare |
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Jul. 24, 1937 |
The New Race in Armaments |
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May 05, 1932 |
Abolition of Aggressive Weapons |
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