Problems after a cease-fire in korea
What to do about Red China is rapidly emerging as the most difficult problem for the United States in the Far East. Directly connected with it are the formidable political issues of the future of Formosa and Chinese Communist representation in the United Nations. Moscow and Peking are certain to press these questions in the peace negotiations that will follow successful conclusion of a Korean armistice.
Armistice talks between the U.N. Command, headed by the United States, and military representatives of North Korea and Red China have been limited to purely military questions. When they were broken off last October after 15 months of negotiation, agreement had been reached on all agenda items except repatriation of war prisoners. If the prisoner problem is solved in the talks resumed at Panmunjom on Apr. 26, the draft armistice agreement should be in shape for early signing. After conclusion of an armistice, the next step would be to arrange a political conference for a peace settlement.
Provision for Early Peace Conference
Article 60 of the Korean draft armistice agreement, as formulated by the military negotiators, recommends that the governments concerned hold a political conference three months after the armistice goes into effect. The article specifically provides that the conference should negotiate on withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea, peaceful settlement of the Korean (political) question, “et cetera.” The “et cetera” was added in February 1952 after the U.N. Command had rejected a Red request that the Formosa question and Chinese Communist representation in the U.N. be named as subjects for discussion at the peace conference. The full scope of the conference clearly has been left for future diplomatic decision; either side could propose that the agenda be broadened to cover other Far Eastern problems.